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9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIF	ORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION				
10						
11	CORY SPENCER, an individual; DIANA MILENA REED, an individual; and	Case No. 2:16-cv-2129				
12	COASTAL PROTECTION RANGERS, INC., a California non-profit public	Judge: Hon. S. James Otero Dept: Courtroom 10C				
13	benefit corporation,) Magistrate Judge:				
14	Plaintiff,	Hon. Rozella A. Oliver				
15	VS.	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT				
16	LUNADA BAY BOYS; THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE	OF CHARLIE FERRARA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY				
17	LUNADA BAY BOYS, including but not limited to SANG LEE, BRANT	JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL				
18	BLAKEMAN, ALAN JOHNSTON AKA JALIAN JOHNSTON, MICHAEL RAE	SUMMARY JUDGMENT				
19	PAPAYANS, ANGELO FERRARA, FRANK FERRARA, CHARLIE	Filed concurrently with Notice of Motion; Request for Judicial Notice of				
20	FERRARA; CITY OF PALOS VERDES ESTATES; CHIEF OF POLICE JEFF) Adjudicative Facts; Declaration of) Tiffany Bacon; Notices of Lodging;				
21	KEPLEY, in his representative capacity; and DOES 1-10,) proposed Statement of Uncontroverted) Facts and Conclusions of Law and				
22	Defendants.) [Proposed] Judgment lodged) herewith]				
23	——————————————————————————————————————	Date: August 21, 2017				
24		Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept: Courtroom 10C				
25		Complaint Filed: March 29, 2016				
26		Trial Date: November 7. 2017				
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Defendant CHARLIE FERRARA ("Defendant" or "Charlie Ferrara") hereby submits his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs', CORY SPENCER ("Plaintiff Spencer"), DIANA MILENA REED ("Plaintiff Reed") and COASTAL PROTECTION RANGERS, INC. ("Plaintiff CPR") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), causes of action asserted against him in this action, including: (1) Bane Act; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Assault; (4) Battery; and (5) Negligence¹ or, alternatively, partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' causes of action for Bane Act, Public Nuisance, Assault and Battery only.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit stems from allegations of various intentional and negligent bad acts by a purported "surf gang," referred to by Plaintiffs as the "Lunada Bay Boys." Plaintiffs', CORY SPENCER ("Plaintiff Spencer"), DIANA MILENA REED ("Plaintiff Reed") and COASTAL PROTECTION RANGERS, INC. ("Plaintiff CPR") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") assert that the defendants in this action, including defendant and moving party CHARLIE FERRARA ("Defendant" or "Charlie Ferrara"), qualify as members of this so-called "gang," and that Charlie Ferrara himself has violated the Bane Act, caused a public nuisance and committed acts of assault, battery and negligence. The evidence reveals a complete dearth of any facts demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara engaged in even one single act or omission capable of supporting any of Plaintiffs' claims. As a result, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara are groundless.

¹ On or about July 22, 2016, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of California Coastal Act.

As a result, judgment must be entered in favor of Charlie Ferrara on Plaintiffs' Complaint as a matter of law.²

Plaintiffs can proffer no admissible evidence that Charlie Ferrara was involved in any action and/or inaction undertaken by the purported "surf gang," or any other act or omission capable of supporting judgment in favor of any Plaintiff. After this Court's resounding rejection of Plaintiffs' purported Class Action claims, Plaintiffs much each prove all of their claims against Charlie Ferrara to prevail. Plaintiffs have throughout this case clung to the misguided belief that Plaintiff Reed captured an audio recording of Charlie Ferrara making distasteful statements potentially capable of supporting their Claims. Not only has Charlie Ferrara consistently asserted the voice on the recording was not his, indeed the person whose voice was captured by Plaintiff Reed admits he, and not Charlie Ferrara, made such statements. The debunked recording was the last thread of evidence connecting Plaintiffs' claimed damages to Charlie Ferrara. With the indisputable severance of that thread, all of the claims against Charlie Ferrara are devoid of any factual support.

Plaintiffs' other purported "facts" establishing Charlie Ferrara as part of the "surf gang" engaged in harassing activity fail to establish a causal connection between Charlie Ferrara and Plaintiffs' claimed harm. Surfing at Lunada Bay on a regular basis during the surf season does not equate to liability, or even knowledge of the tortious behavior of others that serves as the basis of Plaintiffs' claims. Given the lack of any admissible evidence connecting Charlie Ferrara's actions to Plaintiffs' claimed harm, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiffs' claims against him, and Charlie Ferrara is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law on all of Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.

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² If the Court is not inclined to grant summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' causes of action against Charlie Ferrara; the moving party alternatively requests partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for Bane Act, Public Nuisance, Assault and Battery only.

For all of the reasons set forth herein and the evidence submitted in support of this Motion, the uncontroverted facts demonstrate that all of Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara lack merit, and Charlie Ferrara is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

2. STATEMENT OF FACTS

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2.1 **Factual Background**

Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Charlie Ferrara including the following: (1) Bane Act; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Assault; (4) Battery; and (5) Negligence. None of these claims are supported by the evidence in this case. Charlie Ferrara was in the presence of Plaintiff Reed on only two occasions prior to the filing of this action. The first was on February 13, 2016; however, at that time he was not involved in the interactions she had with other individuals on that day, he was merely sitting nearby preparing to go out surfing. (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law ("SUF") ¶ 3, 9, 12-13.) The second interaction occurred a few months later, when Charlie Ferrara observed Plaintiff Reed sitting at 16 | the patio at Lunada Bay but did not engage in any conversation or other interaction with her. (SUF ¶ 3.) Charlie Ferrara has never met or interacted with Plaintiff Spencer. (SUF ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact supporting any of their Clams against Charlie Ferrara because this case is devoid of any evidence that Charlie Ferrara participated in any activity capable of supporting Plaintiffs' claims.

2.1.1 Background Facts Relating to the Ferrara Defendants

There are four members of the Ferrara family being sued in this action. Charlie Ferrara, the moving party, is the son of Defendant Frank Ferrara. (SUF ¶ 1.) Charlie Ferrara is also the nephew to Defendant Angelo Ferrara and the cousin to Defendant N.F. (SUF ¶ 2.) Defendant Angelo Ferrara is also the father to non-party Leo Ferrara, whose spoke the words Plaintiff Reed recorded and mistakenly believed was Charlie Ferrara (SUF ¶ 2).

2.1.2 Facts Specific to Plaintiff Spencer

Plaintiff Spencer was deposed on October 11, 2016. Prior to January of 2016, Plaintiff Spencer never surfed at Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 5.) Plaintiff Spencer has never had any interactions with Charlie Ferrara, and he did not testify about any actions attributable to Charlie Ferrara. (SUF ¶¶ 4-6; Request for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts ("RJN"), Ex. H.) When asked about Defendant Angelo Ferrara (Charlie Ferrara's uncle), Plaintiff Spencer admitted he had no specific knowledge of Charlie Ferrara's actions relative to the allegations in this case, testifying under oath "...I can't identify to you a ... Ferrara from the next Ferrara" (SUF ¶ 6.) 10 Plaintiff Spencer thus admits his knowledge of supposed actions by the Ferrara family members is based on gossip, nothing but speculation and conjecture. Put simply, Plaintiff Spencer can proffer no evidence capable of supporting his claims against Charlie Ferrara and, despite making inflammatory allegations of violent and harassing acts against him, Spencer could not even identify Charlie Ferrara if he saw him. (SUF ¶¶ 4-6.)

2.1.3 Facts Specific to Plaintiff Reed

Plaintiff Reed was deposed on October 24, 2016. Just as Plaintiff Spencer, Plaintiff Reed never surfed at Lunada Bay prior to January of 2016. (SUF ¶ 7.)

On February 13, 2016, Plaintiff Reed visited the patio at Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 8.) Charlie Ferrara was by the corner of the patio that day, in the morning, getting ready to go surfing. (SUF ¶ 9.) Charlie Ferrara observed a person he later learned was Plaintiff Reed, a second woman, Defendant Brant Blakeman and Defendant Alan Johnston on the patio that morning. (SUF ¶ 10.) Charlie Ferrara did not participate in the interaction that took place between Reed, Blakeman, Johnston and the other person and did not hear the words that were exchanged among the group. (SUF ¶ 11.) When Charlie Ferrara returned to the beach from surfing, two police officers were present. (SUF \P 12.)

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Plaintiff Reed was apparently operating under the mistaken belief when she filed her lawsuit that she had recorded Charlie Ferrara making distasteful comments to her, potentially supportive of her claim. However, indisputable facts demonstrate that the man speaking in the recording was not Charlie Ferrara, but rather was Charlie Ferrara's cousin, Leo Ferrara. (SUF ¶ 15.) Not only has Leo Ferrara signed a declaration admitting to this fact, but his brother Defendant N.F. also identified Leo Ferrara's voice in the recording previously alleged to be Charlie's. (SUF ¶ 16.) Moreover, the speaker in the subject recording advised Plaintiff Reed that he lived on the Palos Verdes peninsula and that his father worked on cars. (SUF ¶ 17.) Defendant Angelo Ferrara, Leo Ferrara's father, lived in Palos Verdes Estates at the time of the recording while Charlie Ferrara's father (Defendant Frank Ferrara), lived in Wildomar at the time the recording was made. (SUF ¶¶ 18-19.) Charlie Ferrara lives in San Pedro, and previously lived with his parents in Wildomar – not on the Palos Verdes peninsula. (SUF ¶ 20.) It is undisputed that Defendant Frank Ferrara does not work on cars, rather he is in car sales, while Defendant Angelo Ferrara owns an auto paint and body shop. (SUF ¶ 21-22.) The indisputable evidence establishes that Charlie Ferrara was not the person who had a conversation with Plaintiff Reed in 2016, and therefore none of the statements by the speaker in that recording can be attributed to Charlie Ferrara.

There is no evidence that Charlie Ferrara was actively or passively involved in any bad acts nebulously asserted against the Defendants in this case. Undisputable facts demonstrate Charlie Ferrara was not party to the interaction between Plaintiff Reed, Blakeman and Johnston on February 13, 2016 on the patio at Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶¶ 9-13.) No evidence connects Charlie Ferrara to any bad acts (or any interaction whatsoever with Plaintiff) on that date. (SUF ¶¶ 8-13.) In sum, Charlie Ferrara has demonstrated a complete lack of factual support for any of Plaintiff Reed's Claims against him.

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2.1.4 Facts Specific to Plaintiff CPR

Plaintiff CPR makes no specific allegations against Charlie Ferrara nor has discovery revealed any facts to support any of CPR's claims against Charlie Ferrara. Plaintiff CPR does not have standing, as an entity, to assert the majority of the claims being made against Charlie Ferrara in this action. Moreover, the President of Plaintiff CPR submitted a declaration in support of Plaintiffs' denied Motion for Class Certification; however, the declaration did not assert any harm suffered by declarant, Mark Slatten, or any harm suffered by the entity, CPR. (RJN, Ex. K.) More specifically, the declarant made no mention of Charlie Ferrara as a person responsible for its alleged damages due to the fact that Plaintiff CPR can proffer no evidence capable of demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara was ever involved in any wrongful actions at Lunada Bay.

2.1.5 Discovery Demonstrates an Utter Dearth of Evidence Supporting Plaintiffs Claims Against Charlie Ferrara

Plaintiffs' supplemental disclosures purport to identify two witnesses as having information pertaining to their claims against members of the Ferrara family, but the disclosures are vague to the point of meaninglessness, and fail even to identify to which member of the Ferrara family the disclosures refer. (RJN, Ex. E at10:7-10:20 and 19:16-19:21.) As mentioned above, apart from Charlie Ferrara, there are three other members of the Ferrara family by Plaintiffs named as defendants in this action. Ken Claypool and Jim Russi were identified as having information relating to "one or more of the Ferraras." However, in discovery, neither of these witnesses ended up testifying to any facts supporting Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara in this action.

Ken Claypool was deposed on June 13, 2017 and could not identify Charlie Ferrara, stating he would "have to see pictures and determine actually who's who" among the Defendants in this case. (SUF ¶ 23.) Later in his deposition, Mr. Claypool misidentified Charlie Ferrara as having dark hair, when in fact Charlie

Ferrara has (and has always had) blonde hair. (SUF ¶ 24.) Ken Claypool did not testify to ever seeing Charlie Ferrara threaten or intimidate anyone at Lunada Bay, engage in any wrongful behavior at Lunada Bay, or become involved in any altercation with anyone at Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 25.) Mr. Claypool never had any conversations with Plaintiff Reed or Plaintiff Spencer about any actions of Charlie Ferrara relating to the claims in this case. (SUF ¶ 26.) Mr. Claypool's purported knowledge of Charlie Ferrara comes not from any personal experiences with him, but rather from Facebook posts and gossip --in sum, nothing but speculation and conjecture. (SUF ¶ 27.) Mr. Claypool testified he only heard secondhand Charlie 10 | Ferrara was one of the individuals that harassed Plaintiff Reed, not that he had any personal knowledge of relevant facts. (SUF ¶ 28.) Mr. Claypool's testimony is not 11 admissible evidence capable of supporting Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara. 12 13 Plaintiffs also identified Jim Russi in their supplemental disclosures as a witness with information relating to their claims against "one or more of the 14 Ferraras." However, Jim Russi confessed he has no knowledge of Charlie Ferrara 15 participating in any wrongful conduct at or near Lunada Bay or Charlie Ferrara being 16

involved in any illegal activity at or near Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 29.) Thus, Mr. Russi's testimony too is devoid of admissible evidence supporting Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara.

Further still, Plaintiffs can proffer no admissible evidence demonstrating a causal connection between any act or omission of Charlie Ferrara and their claimed damages in this case. Plaintiff Spencer and Plaintiff Reed were served with Interrogatories, Requests for Admission and Requests for Production of Documents on behalf of Charlie Ferrara. Despite Charlie Ferrara's requests that Plaintiffs identify all facts, witnesses and documents in support of Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara, no admissible evidence of the same was produced. (SUF ¶ 30.) The single piece of evidence Plaintiffs ever had even tangentially supporting their claims against Charlie Ferrara was the 13-minute recording of Plaintiff Reed speaking with

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Leo Ferrara, now indisputably proven not to depict the voice of Charlie Ferrara. (SUF ¶¶ 30; 14-22.) Plaintiffs' discovery responses provide no other specific facts in any way supporting any claim against Charlie Ferrara. (SUF ¶ 30, Ex. W.)

Lastly, while Plaintiffs speculate (without any factual support) that communications between Defendant Sang Lee and Charlie Ferrara may be supportive of their claims against Charlie Ferrara, the production of the entirety of Sang Lee's phone records demonstrates no communications supportive of Plaintiffs' claims actually exist. Further, Defendant Sang Lee testified that Charlie Ferrara never had any communications with him about the Plaintiffs or about preventing anyone from visiting or surfing at Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 34.) Charlie Ferrara admits that he has 10 ▮ communicated with Defendant Sang Lee on several occasions, but that those communications were unrelated to the claims alleged in this case. (SUF ¶ 35.) Plaintiffs have no evidence to the contrary. Defendant Sang Lee has never witnessed Charlie Ferrara attempting to prevent persons from visiting or surfing Lunada Bay. (SUF ¶ 36.)

Procedural Background 2.2

On March 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint against the following defendants: Lunada Bay Boys; the Individual Members of the Lunada Bay Boys, including but not limited to Sang Lee, Brant Blakeman, Alan Johnston aka Jalian Johnston, Michael Rae Papayans, Angelo Ferrara, Frank Ferrara, Charlie Ferrara and N.F.; City of Palos Verdes Estates; Chief of Police Jeff Kepley, in his representative capacity; and DOES 1-10. (RJN, Ex. A.) Plaintiffs asserted causes of action against Charlie Ferrara including the following: (1) Bane Act; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Violation of California Coastal Act; (4) Assault; (5) Battery; and (6) Negligence. Charlie Ferrara filed his Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint on September 2, 2016. (RJN, Ex. B.)

Prior to Charlie Ferrara's appearance in this matter, on June 3, 2016, Defendants, City of Palos Verdes Estates and Chief of Police Jeff Kepley, filed a

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motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. On July 11, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' third cause of action for violation of the California Coastal Act. (RJN, Ex. C at 10-13.) On August 29, 2016, the Court held a Scheduling Conference, wherein the parties stipulated that the Court's order of July 11, 2017 shall apply to all defendants. (RJN, Ex. D at 1.)

Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification on December 29, 2016. The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion on February 21, 2017. (RJN, Ex. F.) Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal this Court's order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Action Certification, which Petition was denied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 18, 2017. (RJN, Ex. G.) Based on the foregoing, the only claims remaining to be adjudicated in favor of Charlie Ferrara in this action are those specifically impacting the individual Plaintiffs. Thus, the claims alleged against Charlie Ferrara and subject of this motion are: (1) Bane Act; (2) Public Nuisance; (3) Assault; (4) Battery; and (5) Negligence.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, this Motion is made following the conference of counsel which took place on July 12, 2017. (Declaration of Tiffany Bacon, ¶ 3.)

Charlie Ferrara now herein submits his Motion for Summary Judgment on the aforementioned claims, and he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.

3. LEGAL ARGUMENT

3.1 This Court Has Authority to Grant Charlie Ferrara's Motion for Summary Judgment

The right to move for summary judgment is established by *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, Rule 56. "A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the part of each claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).)

"Summary judgment is a marvelous instrument in expediting the administration of justice. It is the means by which causes or defenses with no real merit are weeded out without the hazard of a decision on an

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artificial situation described by artful pleadings, or without the cost in precious judicial time of a long protracted trial which ends with a determination that, on the facts viewed most favorably to the party, the claim or defense is not good as a matter of law." (Bros v. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1958).) "Where a defendant thinks that he is entitled to a judgment either on pleadings or on

basis of extrinsic facts established by affidavits, depositions, or stipulations, he may at any time move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor under the Rules." (Gifford v. Travelers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1946.) "The moving party need not disprove plaintiff's claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance." (Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1987).)

Furthermore, "a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial . . . [T]he plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat" a motion for summary judgment. (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 256-57 (1986).)

Charlie Ferrara's motion is made under the aforementioned statutory authority and case law. As is demonstrated by this motion, all of Plaintiffs' claims against Charlie Ferrara are without merit. Plaintiffs have no admissible evidence whatsoever to support their causes of action for (1) Bane Act, (2) Public Nuisance, (3) Assault, (4) Battery, or (5) Negligence against Charlie Ferrara. For this reason, Charlie Ferrara is entitled to summary judgment in his favor on all of Plaintiffs' claims asserted against him in this action.3

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If the Court is not inclined to grant summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' causes of action against Charlie Ferrara; the moving party alternatively requests partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for Bane Act, Public Nuisance, Assault and Battery only.

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3.2

Charlie Ferrara Is Entitled to Judgment In His Favor On Plaintiffs' Claims for Bane Act, Public Nuisance, Assault and Battery Because Plaintiffs' Can Proffer No Admissible Evidence To Support These Claims

3.2.1 Bane Act

In order demonstrate Charlie Ferrara is liable to Plaintiffs under the Bane Act, Plaintiffs must prove that (1) Charlie Ferrara interfered with [or attempted to interfere with] Plaintiffs' constitutional rights or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts and that (2) Plaintiffs reasonably believed that if [they] exercised [their] [constitutional or statutory] rights Charlie Ferrara would commit violence against [them] or [their] property. (CACI 3025; Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.) "Section 52.1 does require an attempted or completed act of interference with a legal right, accompanied by a form of coercion." (Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (Cal. 1998) [emphasis added].) Further, "it is clear that to state a cause of action under section 52.1 there must first be violence or intimidation by threat of violence." (Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 (1998).) The record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara committed any act of violence, intimidation or interference capable of supporting Plaintiffs' Bane Act claims.

The Bane Act claim also alleges conspiracy among the defendants. However, even assuming, *arguendo*, this Court determines a disputed issue of fact as to the statements of Charlie Ferrara, Civil Code section 52.1(j) provides,

"[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b), except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that the persona threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the threat."

Further, "[u]nder California law, '[a] conspiracy is an agreement entered into between two or more person with the specific intent to agree to commit' a specified crime, 'with the further specific intent to commit that crime..., followed by an overt

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act committed in this state by one (or more) of the parties for the purposes of accomplishing the object of the agreement." (United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004).) "Knowledge alone of tortious conduct is insufficient to prove a conspiracy agreement. Actual knowledge of the planned tort, without more, is insufficient to serve as the basis for a conspiracy claim. Knowledge of the planned tort must be combined with intent to aid in its commission." (Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Russolillo, 162 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1207 (C.D. Cal 2001).)

As is demonstrated by the indisputable evidence, Plaintiffs have no admissible evidence demonstrating either has ever even had a conversation with Charlie Ferrara, to say nothing of being intimidated by Charlie Ferrara. (SUF ¶¶ 3-34) Nor is there any admissible evidence demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara ever attempted to interfere with or actually interfered with any of Plaintiffs' constitutional or statutory rights. (SUF ¶¶ 3-30; 34) Charlie Ferrara has proven with admissible evidence the absence of any factual support for Plaintiffs' Bane Act claims. Thus the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate that any communications exchanged or expressed by Charlie Ferrara led them to reasonably fear that violence would be committed against them, or that Charlie Ferrara entered into an agreement with the codefendants with the specific intent of committing a crime against any of the Plaintiffs followed by an overt act. (Civ. Code § 52.1(j).) Plaintiffs cannot carry this burden, and Charlie Ferrara is therefore entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. (SUF ¶¶ 3-34.) While Plaintiffs will argue a disputed issue of fact may exist because they have yet to review certain, irrelevant text messages between the defendants, their argument is based on pure speculation. Charlie Ferrara has denied communicating with any other Defendant regarding the subject matter of this case. (SUF ¶ 33.) No Defendant has testified that he communicated with Charlie Ferrara on the subject matter of this case. With no evidence to demonstrate that Charlie Ferrara ever 26 interfered with Plaintiffs' rights or threatened violence against Plaintiffs, Charlie

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Ferrara is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' cause of action for Bane Act, including the purported conspiracy allegations.

3.2.2 Public Nuisance

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Plaintiffs assert a claim for Public Nuisance against Charlie Ferrara pursuant to California Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480. Section 3479 provides:

"Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passages or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance."

Further, Section 3480 states that "[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of person, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal."

California Civil Code section 3493 provides that "[a] private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance, if it specifically injurious to himself, but not otherwise." "An essential element of a cause of action for nuisance is damage or injury. (Helix Land Co., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932 (1978).) Not only do Plaintiff Spencer and Plaintiff Reed lack any factual support for their claim for public nuisance against Charlie Ferrara, but they also lack standing to bring this claim because they have not demonstrated damages suffered by them, if any, that were caused by Charlie Ferrara.

The same evidence detailed above demonstrates Charlie Ferrara has not engaged in any behavior injurious or obstructive to Plaintiffs, any community or neighborhood. Plaintiffs have not and cannot present any evidence that any actions by Charlie Ferrara interfered with Plaintiffs' comfortable enjoyment of life or property. There is no evidence in this case that Charlie Ferrara ever attempted to 26 prevent others' use and enjoyment of Lunada Bay, including Plaintiffs, who have had ample opportunity to provide such evidence but failed to do so. (See SUF ¶¶ 3-34.)

Plaintiffs can proffer no admissible evidence that Charlie Ferrara ever took a single action in violation of California Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, as is demonstrated by the indisputable evidence. The record is devoid of facts demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara interfered with any person's or community's enjoyment of life, property or access to Lunada Bay or surrounding areas. As such, Charlie Ferrara is entitled to judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs' claim for public nuisance because Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a genuine dispute as to any material fact relating to this claim.

3.2.3 Assault

"[A]n assault is a demonstration of an unlawful intent by one person to inflict immediate injury on the person of another then present." (Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-7 (1944).) "Mere words however threatening or profane will not amount to assault." (Tomblinson v. Nobile, 103 Cal.App.2d 266 (1951).)

The evidence in this case does not support that Charlie Ferrara ever even came into contact with either Plaintiff, much less that he intended to or did inflict immediate injury to either of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have not testified to that fact nor have they provided any evidence in support of this claim. Plaintiffs have not 18 | identified and cannot identify any interaction either have had with Charlie Ferrara that would amount to assault. Moreover, while there is no evidence in this case of any communications between Charlie Ferrara and any of the other co-defendants, or any other person, relating to the Plaintiffs, even assuming, arguendo, such communications existed, written or spoken words alone would not be supportive of Plaintiffs' assault claim as words do not form a factual basis for assault.

There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Charlie Ferrara ever intended to inflict harm on Plaintiff Spencer and Plaintiff Reed. Plaintiffs' cause of action for assault indisputably lacks any factual basis, and should be summarily adjudicated in favor of Charlie Ferrara.

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3.2.4 Battery

"A battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with the person of another . . . A contact is 'unlawful' if it is unconsented to." (Ashcroft v. King, 228 Cal.App.3d 604, 611 (1991).) It is more than clear based on the evidence presented in support of this Motion that Charlie Ferrara has never come into any physical contact with the Plaintiffs, most certainly not unlawful and harmful contact that was not consented to by Plaintiffs. (See SUF ¶¶ 3-34.) Without being able to identify any physical interaction either has had with Charlie Ferrara, Plaintiffs can present absolutely no admissible evidence to support their claim for battery against Charlie Ferrara. Plaintiffs' cause of action for battery is frivolous, without merit and must be summarily adjudicated in favor of Charlie Ferrara.

3.3 Charlie Ferrara is Entitled to Judgment in His Favor on Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim

"Although questions of negligence are usually reserved for the factfinder, summary judgment is proper where the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from them. Negligence then becomes a matter of law."

(Flying Diamond Corp. v. Pennaluna & Co., 586 F.2d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 1978).)

"The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury." (Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (Cal. 1996); see also Shatford v. L.S. Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. CV 15-1767 BRO (AJW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52473 (C.D. Cal Mar. 29, 2016).)

Assuming Charlie Ferrara owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs in this action, which is not supported by the evidence in this case as they appear to have never come into meaningful contact with each other, Plaintiffs lack evidence demonstrating that Charlie Ferrara ever breached a duty of care owed to the Plaintiffs. Without being able to prove this element of their claim, Plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action for negligence against Charlie Ferrara. Under oath, Plaintiff Spencer and

Plaintiff Reed provided no testimony regarding any interaction with Charlie Ferrara or any action or inaction undertaken by Charlie Ferrara that would amount to Charlie Ferrara's liability in this case under a cause of action for negligence. Moreover, Plaintiffs have no evidence that they suffered any damage and/or injury as a result of any action or inaction undertaken by Charlie Ferrara. (SUF ¶¶ 3-30.) It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have no evidence to support their claim for 6 negligence against Charlie Ferrara. Plaintiffs have no evidence Charlie Ferrara has ever engaged in any wrongful act that has caused them injury. (See SUF ¶¶ 3-34.) The only reasonable conclusion to draw from the lack of Plaintiffs' evidence is that Charlie Ferrara is not liable for negligence against the Plaintiffs. Based thereon, 10 judgment should be entered in favor of Charlie Ferrara on Plaintiffs' cause of action 11 for negligence. 12 4. 13 CONCLUSION Put simply, there is no evidence Charlie Ferrara is liable to Plaintiffs under the 14 causes of action being asserted in this case. Plaintiffs have no evidence that Charlie 15 Ferrara caused them any damages. 16 For the reasons set forth herein, Charlie Ferrara is entitled to summary 17 judgment in his favor. 18 BREMER WHYTE BROWN & O'MEARA Dated: July , 2017 19 LLP 20 21 22 Alison K. Hurley Tiffany L. Bacon 23 ttorneys for Defendants ANK FERRARA and CHARLIE 24 **FERRARA** 25 26

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1	PROOF OF SERVICE			
2				
3 4	I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 20320 S.W. Birch Street, Second Floor, Newport Beach, California 92660.			
5	On July 24, 2017, I served the within document(s) described as:			
6	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF CHARLIE			
7	FERRARA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT			
8	on the interested parties in this action as stated on the attached mailing list.			
9	X (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) Complying with Code of Civil Procedure § 1010, I caused such document(s) to be Electronically Filed and Served through the _for the above-entitled			
10	case. Upon completion of transmission of said document(s), a filing receipt is issued to the filing party acknowledging receipt, filing and service by 's system. A copy of the [Email			
11	receipt System] filing receipt page will be maintained with the original document(s) in our office.			
12	Executed on July 24, 2017, at Newport Beach, California.			
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California th				
14	foregoing is true and correct.			
15	Hailey Williams . Tailey William			
16	(Type or print name) (Signature)			
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NEWPORT BCH, CA 92660 (949) 221-1000	H:\1178\176\PROOF OF SERVICE.docx			

1	Cory Spencer v. Lunada Bay Boys et al.,			
2		Case No. 2:16-cv-2129-SJO		
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